Universities must confront the “taboo” subject of Russian intelligence “targeting academia”, according to an expert.
The influence the Russian state has over both its own universities and Western scholarship is “the elephant in the lecture hall”, claims Sanshiro Hosaka, research fellow at Estonia’s International Centre for Defence and Security, in a .
He used declassified materials, open-source intelligence and investigative journalism to study the relationship between Russian intelligence activities and academia.
Pointing to recent cases including the?conviction of former University of Tartu professor Viacheslav Morozov, who was sentenced to six years in prison for “activities in the interests of a foreign security service”, and the?, accused of spying for Russia while working at the University of Troms?, Hosaka concludes that “Russian intelligence agencies view higher education and academic exchanges as alluring opportunities for their covert operations”.
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Hosaka, whose background is in intelligence studies, told?探花视频?that: “this has been a taboo for many Western and Russian scholars”.
At Russian universities, Hosaka said, the presence of security officers has been “institutionalised”. He described practices including vetting scientific publications, monitoring the social media posts of students and staff and mandatory briefings and debriefings of university employees travelling abroad.
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Such practices, which have “evolved under Putin’s presidency”, have “compromised not only the institutional autonomy of universities but also individual freedoms: the freedom to conduct research, engage in academic exchange, express views on political issues, and operate free from politically motivated surveillance,” Hosaka writes.
“Most [Russian] scholars remain silent because of their concerns about job security,” he told?THE.
Russian studies scholars from overseas, meanwhile – who often rely on access to data and contacts in Russia – have faced pressure to “modify their research designs or shift their projects to different sites or countries”, Hosaka writes.
Intelligence agencies may “employ carrot-and-stick tactics”, he noted, by “offering lucrative research opportunities while simultaneously issuing threats such as deportation or long-term entry bans”.
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“Such coercive measures serve to control scholars’ access to Russia,” he writes.
Stressing that not all “Russian scholars or international scholars visiting Russia are potential intelligence agents”, Hosaka advised universities and academics?considering collaborations with Russia, particularly in the wake of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that?saw many institutions sever such ties, to “critically assess how autocratic intelligence agencies exploit open research and education environments”.
Hosaka said he?opted to publish the paper in?Studies in Higher Education?rather than an intelligence-focused journal “to raise awareness among people engaging in higher education” of the issue.
Calling for an approach that preserves institutional autonomy and academic freedom, Hosaka said: “The first thing we should do is recognise the modus operandi of Russian intelligence agencies, and how they can exploit academic exchanges.
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“We should collect a lot of case studies, and inform academic communities, including students, of the possible malicious use of academic platforms.”
“I hope my article will serve as a wake-up call to higher education circles,” he said.
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