For the upcoming seven-year funding period (2028¨C34), the European Commission plans to allocate within Pillar II of Horizon Europe. The emperor of European research funding is no miser, even when it comes to the social sciences. He is naked, nevertheless.

At least in the social sciences, the funding of collaborative research within Pillar II suffers from numerous structural defects. Among them are the bureaucratic nightmare of project administration; its structural eurocentrism (the rest of the world is just context); and the haphazard nature of many consortia, brought together by bureaucratic criteria around regional and disciplinary representation instead of the logic of research design.

One major defect is the open madness of Pillar II¡¯²õ thematic calls. I do not claim to be a seasoned Horizon expert and my evaluation is illustrative, not systematic. Familiar with the comparative study of democracy and authoritarianism, I focus on the recent call for research on ¡°¡± which I believe to be typical of common pathologies (by the time it closed last month, it had received , three of which will receive funding).

Against the inherent tendency of the social sciences to fragment into ever tinier islands of specialisation, Horizon Europe projects ask big questions. The track on ¡°¡± pursues high-flying goals, including to ¡°reinvigorate and defend democratic governance¡±, ¡°protect liberties and the rule of law¡±, ¡°expand political participation, social dialogue and social inclusion¡± and ¡°shield democracy from multidimensional threats¡±.

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All fine. However, typical Horizon calls do not pose clear questions. They gesture toward vast thematic landscapes and ask for the impossible: ¡°We want it all!¡± For instance, ¡°the autocratic appeal¡± asked projects to deliver the following:

• Analyses across the whole spectrum of political regimes, from ¡°established democracies¡± to ¡°autocracies¡±.
• Analyses of ¡°state and non-state actors¡± interacting in ¡°transnational and globalised configurations¡±.
• Descriptive data on ¡°authoritarian tendencies¡± and ¡°strategies¡±.
• Predictive data for ¡°early warning¡± systems.
• Explanations based on ¡°structural pre-conditions¡±, authoritarian ¡°motivations and strategies¡± and strategies of resistance.
• Demand-side explanations of the ¡°popularity¡± of authoritarianism.
• Descriptive data on ¡°modalities, actors and patterns of resistance¡±.
• Historical comparisons to draw ¡°lessons from the past¡±.
• An analysis of European experiences ¡°within a global context¡±.
• A ¡°multidisciplinary¡± approach ¡°integrating fields such as political science, law, sociology, philosophy, psychology, media and digital studies, gender studies, and history¡±.

No reasonable research project could cover that much. Any single theme would be more than enough.

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In addition to thematic overload, we have thematic dispersion. Like other Horizon calls, ¡°The autocratic appeal¡± kept piling topics on topics. Striving for comprehensive coverage of all authoritarian strategies and forms of resistance, it also introduced various side topics:

• Specific authoritarian strategies: ¡°digital authoritarianism¡± and distractive ¡°gender-equality reforms¡±.
• Specific actors of resistance: ¡°public authorities, civil society organisations, media, citizens¡± and ¡°LGBTIQ people and religious, migrant or ethnic minorities¡±.
• Specific targets of resistance: ¡°heteronormative and whitewashing activities [in] domains such as culture and arts, entertainment industry, tourism or sports¡±.
• Specific forms of resistance: ¡°protest and investigative research and advocacy¡± as well as ¡°media literacy, culture, creativity and arts¡±.

Clearly, the logic behind the selection of subthemes is political, not scientific. They look like pet topics of political or bureaucratic insiders. If the commission were genuinely interested in any of these, it would open specific calls on them. And it would do so recognising the state of knowledge.

What do we want to know? It depends on what we care about and what we know already. In the social sciences, research questions emerge from a dialogue between empirical realities and the scholarly literature. But Horizon calls tend to ignore what we already know. Accordingly, they do not formulate research questions; they simply ask questions. Just as laypeople do.

¡°The autocratic appeal¡± asked many such uninformed, ¡°naive¡± questions. For example:

• ¡°How does autocracy work?¡± Global research on and tells us.
• ¡°Why does authoritarianism continue to spread?¡± The flourishing literature on and gives some answers.
• What explains the ¡°acceptance of autocratic approaches in well-functioning established democracies¡±? A multitude of and address this question.
• Which are ¡°the modalities, actors and patters of resistance¡± against autocratisation? The study of against the subversion of democracy has become a flourishing field of research.
• How can we ¡°protect democracies from autocratic tendencies¡±? The emergent literature on pursues similar concerns.

What do these bodies of literature fail to see or explain? What puzzles do they generate? What controversies or contradictions do they contain? The call does not tell us. It¡¯²õ as if we told climate scientists: ¡°Hey, we¡¯re in a climate crisis. Can you tell us what it looks like, how we got into this mess, and what we can do about it?¡± As if we knew nothing about it.

The call is also full of platitudes and false certainties. One example is the very premise that justifies it: the ¡°ongoing wave of autocratisation¡±.? ¨C and if yes, ¨C is actually .

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In addition to unscientific certitude, Horizon Europe tends to embrace technocratic naivety. It asks science to generate ¡°scientifically robust recommendations¡± for ¡°¡± and ¡°¡±. In particular, the ¡°autocratic appeal¡± aims to provide ¡°authorities, journalists and publics alike¡± with ¡°methods and tools¡± for ¡°resisting and counteracting¡± authoritarian tendencies.

But what if we do not have common problems, but bitter conflicts over the very definition of our problems, in a context of ever greater polarisation? The notion of ¡°scientifically robust recommendations¡± ignores everything that defines : its uncertainties, its moral and strategic dilemmas, its evolving nature and, most importantly, its contentious nature. Warning against polarisation, the call fails to recognise that its is an inherently polarising strategy in itself. Such blindness is an unlikely recipe for democratic success.

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In the social sciences, everyone knows that collaborative Horizon projects are crazy, wasteful endeavours ¨C at least, everyone I know does.

Since these projects demand the impossible, there is only one way to carry them out: through benign simulation. We pretend we deliver ¨C and the commission joins the dance of illusions, declaring itself happy as long as we tick all the boxes, which we routinely do.

We should end this farce. Funding for research is scarce and should be used in sensible ways. There is enough madness in the world already. But do we really want to escape it?

Do EU officials try to delegate the task of saving the world to science because they fear that politicians are clueless? And do we social scientists fear that they will stop funding us if we stop pretending we can save the world?

What happens if the emperor discovers he is naked? Worse, what happens if he likes throwing lavish costume parties and one day discovers that his guests are all naked? Elegant and eloquent, but naked! Will he continue to buy them fancy clothes? Or will he grab his jewels, jump into his stagecoach, and leave the shivering party guests behind in the cold?

is a senior research fellow at the Central European University¡¯²õ Democracy Institute, Budapest.

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