If the end of the cold war did not signal the end of history, it certainly made the arcane world of the nuclear strategist seem past its sell-by date. Yet, nuclear weapons are back on the agenda in Iraq, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Russia still has thousands of nukes, but cannot afford to pay its military to look after them, or its engineers to dismantle them. The politics and management of nuclear deterrence is very much an issue for today as well as one of historical interest.

Beatrice Heuser has produced a scholarly survey of the debates about nuclear weapons in Britain, France and Germany since 1945. I doubt that many readers will find the attitudes of each nation's elite unexpected. She rightly credits the United Kingdom with much of the innovative thinking on nuclear matters in Nato for which it received little credit in Europe. Britain built its nuclear capability because it had been involved in the Manhattan Project and saw itself as having a continuing world power role. It developed a number of entirely logical rationales for retention of nuclear capability as its status in the world declined. Heuser is somewhat unfair on the current British government to suggest that it has steered clear of raising the nuclear question. It has been surprisingly robust on retaining a nuclear capability and seems likely to continue that policy.

The chapter on France is a wonderful survey of all the paradoxes of lost influence that have shaped the country after the war. Nuclear weapons, which had to be truly independent, were seen as essential for the glory of France. The debate was always at a philosophical level. The enemy remained vague and the battle plan seemed irrelevant. France wanted to lead Europe, but was unwilling to share sovereignty on nuclear matters. The recent French approach to nuclear testing in the Pacific suggests that the mentality has not changed.

The Federal Republic of Germany differs in that it has no nuclear weapons of its own. However, it was very much part of Nato nuclear strategy in the cold war. American and British nuclear weapons were located in Germany and French tactical nuclear weapons had such short ranges that they must have been aimed at targets there. While there is ample evidence of the antipathy to militarism in postwar Germany, there is no doubt that the country contributed a major part to the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.

̽»¨ÊÓƵ

The book is shorter than it appears. The three chapters allocated to each country are each supported by copious notes of sources. Over 1,750 notes and the index take up a third of the volume. As an indication of scholastic diligence this is admirable, but they add little to the argument. It will be a useful book for the student of Nato strategy, but is unlikely to appeal to a wider audience, who probably already understand the essential differences between the mentalities of the three nations.

Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden is the author of Can Deterrence Last? and a former nuclear bomber pilot.

̽»¨ÊÓƵ